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IN THE

SUPREME

COURT

of the
STATE

OF

UTAH

RICHARD E. ASHBY
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
\JVHITING & HAYMOND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

The statement of facts as contained in the Appellant'R
Brief does not coincide with the evidence, and especially
~btements which the Appellant in his Brief contends are
umhsputed are at variance with the real facts. of the_ case,
and for that reason Respondent makes~ the following_:
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Highway U-100, also known as First North Street in
Fillmore, Utah, is and was a State Road running in an
east-\vest direction through Fillmore City in Millard County (tr. 9) .. That Se-:ond West ·street in Fillmore runs. in
a north-south direction and interse:cts with Highway_ U-100
(Firsf.Norlh. Sti.-eet) .. That ata1l-tfmes pribr to. the co:itr..:·
meP.cement of construction and improvement of the road ·
at this intersection by Whiting Haymond Construction
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2.

Company on about September 1st, 1960, a stop sign on
the- -northwest corner of the intersection and a ·stop sign
011 the· southeast corner of the intersection had controlled
traffic going either south or north on Second West Street
and which intersected U-100. Five witnesses, Eugene
Ashby, Maxim Thornton, Everett Ashman, Gayle Rasmussen and Merlin Hare, testified as to these stop signs which
controlled the traffic, as being in place to the time of construction work (T 39, 65, 66, 77, 84, 105).
That about 6 ·:30 P.M. on Saturday, October 29, 1960.
the plaintiff and respondent was driving e·ast in his Chevrolet pickup along U-100. (T 9) Respondent was travelling approximately 20 miles per hour. As he apprnached
the intersection of Second West Street he passed a west
bound vehicle several feet before entering the inters.ection.
for whi·ch ·he dimmed his lights. (T 10) Respondent testified on cross examination, that he had no recollection of
anything that happened after he pass.ed the car just before
the -intersection (T58), and further testified as. follows:
"After ·passing a car it takes a second or two to regain
full ·concept of the road ahead, and I guess I just didn't
have time to look anywhere. (T 11) I didn't remember
anything until I woke up in the hospital". (T 49)
The Respondent's vehicle had been struck on the left
side between the door ·and the/rear fender by one Veri
Justesen (T 87), who was proceeding south on Second
West Street when he entered the intersection of Second
West and Highway U-100, which had been left unprotected
by defendant's· removal of the STOP s.ign. The pickup
truf•k was rolled over and the glas1s was broken by the force
of the impact and the front end of the vehicl~ driven by
Justes-en was smashed. (T 87) ·
Within a few minutes ·from the time of impact the
accident ·w·as investigated by Fillmore City Poli~e, Merlin
Hare, and State Trooper Gayle Rasmussen, who testified
that there was no stop sign in place on the northwest cornel' of th~ intersection wh~ch controlled the traffic co~ng
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from the north along Second West into U-100. (T 88)
Officer Hare stated that there was no -co:nStruction
hor~e or other warning device on the night of the acCident
where the stop sign had been. Officer Merlin Hare further stated that he further investigated the accident the
next morning and that there was no stop s.ign·and no con.:.
struction horse at the northwest corner of the intersectiorl
to control or regulate the traffic. (T 92)
Gayle Rasmusse·n, State Highway Troo·pe::r, testified·
that he lives just north of the intersection·· of Second West
and U-100 and that he also assisted in the inves,tigationof
the arcident. That on the night of the accident the stop
sign was down on the ground near a mound of dirt in t~~
general area of where it had formerly been set to control
the traffic. (T 104) He further testified that he s1a'\V no
construction horses or other s-igns in place on· the riighf.of:
the accident. Gayle Ras.muss.en further testified .that ·he··
passed the intersection frequently going to and from work
and that the stop sign had been down for several days befor~ the accident. (T 109) On cross examination, ·aayle
Rasmussen was asked "During the week did you· S·ee 'it
n1m:n on the g-rounrl with your own eyes,?" Trooper Rasr.'l.llssen's· answer, "Yes, I did." (T 110)
Everett Ashman, who lives in the home on the fio·rthwrst corner of the intersention, stated "That the stop sign
was down lying on the ditch bank for apj)roximately a
wepk during- the latter part of October". (T 79) He fur~
ther testified that he didn't recall seeing a co·nstri.rctio:n
horse or construction sign in the area ; that· on returning ·
home at night after dark in his car he missed the bridge
or "Ulvert because the stop sign was not there to guide him
and no other warning in ·its place. (T 79 82) ·
-·-Maxim Thornton, employee of the Fillmore· City Street<
Department. testified thathothstop signs were in p:tace on·
Second West and First North before the construction woir'k·.-:·
began. (T 65) That the stop sign ·was :removed ·and:wa~r:~
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doVv-:n: ·.most of the ·week before the ·accident. He· further,
he· hauled trash past the intersection of SecOJ!d West and u~100 the morning of Saturday, October 29,
and that the stop sign was down on Saturday morning,
which was the morning of the accident. (T 68) He further
testified that there was not any sign or a construction
horse on the northwest corner of the inters.ection of Second
West and U-100 for three days past. It is important to
note that Maxim Thornton testified that he hauled
tt·a9h in a north-south direction along Second West, Saturday ·and h~d· pas:sed the intersection each day previous
thereto and that he didn't observe any construction horses
on the intersection corner on October 27, 28 or 29th,
75) and that the stop sign was down most of that week.
(T.74)
·Veri Justesen, who was not a party to the action, but
who drove his vehicle s:outh along Seeond West into the unprotected intersection, was not a witness in the case and
any testimony or statements allegedly made by Veri Justesen is clearly hearsay and inadmi~sible. It is known, however, that Veri Justesen had res:ided in Delta, Utah and
not Fillmore, for several years, but the fae:t remains that
the construction company, - by the admission of its own·
for~man, testified that the stop sign was remo:ved by them
eaeh day. Then he prop·ped the stop sign against a construction horse in the evening. (T 126) But the foreman for the
defendant construction eornpany testified that the sign was
down a morning. or two the week of the ae"cident. (T 141)
And-the foreman further·testified that he s:pent part .of_ his
time out on the· Holden project (approximately 10 miles
away), and that the crew moved the ·signs at Second West
Street and First North Street each· day for several days ·
while Palfreyman, the foreman, was doing construction at
·
· ··
Holden.. (T 142)
Eugene Ashby testified that because of the location of
the liouse of Everett Ashman on the northwest corner of
the intersection, that one back ·more than 50 feet of the ;

~~tified·: that

rr
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5
cro~s

walks west of the intersection would have impairment of vision to the north. ·Everett Ashman testified that
hi~ house on the northwes·t corner of the ·intersection was·
set back from the property line approximately 20· feet on
the south and approximately 25 feet on the e·ast. (T 77)
This visual obstruction would render the visibility at the
intersection for both traffc from the north and west impaired until they got quite close into the interse'<~tion and
made the necessity for the stop sign to control the traffic·
at Se·cond West Street and U-100 the more important and
ne~Jssary, and with no stop sign or traffic control deVice·:in
place to keep the traffic from the north to 'the :south coni·;·
tro1led because of the defendant's negligence in having
moved the sign, the obvious and easily contetn:rHated result
occured, a motori.st, Veri Justesen, drov,e into the ungUard~
ed intersflction and injured the plaintiff. Inasmuch
the
Appellant's Brief contains. little or no re.ferert"'e.:to the mat...ter of contributing negligence or matter of 'damages .which
were awarded in the trial court, Respo-rld~nt'-:. will not in-··
elude such matters in Statement of Facts. ,- ' ·..

as

ARGUMENT
POINT I

·.

THE ABSENCE OF THE STOP SIGN WAS :
THE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION .. ~·
~

.-

r•..-

.~

• • • .••

·: •

-

-

With four witnesses, Trooper Gayl~. Ras~~s.~~n,_ Wh:o.
resides two blocks north of the First· North ·:s~~i>tuFW~s:(
intersection and who passed the intersecti~~ ·daily
wa~· to and from work; Maxim Thornton~ City Roaq Errt~ ·
ployee, who travelled the r0agcJaily.; Ev~rett ~sp~~p,
l'esides on 'the n·orth"\vest cor"ne:r-· of 'the·. intersection
who .passed the stop sign. a:r:ea, J!ig-_ht. and . rodrning .;~ver'y~
day: _Merlin.Hare.. Citv Police_ Qffic~r~ _·w}J.o ·1nve'stigated·
the accid~pt, e{lch. testifyj:p.g tlJ.~t t~~ sJop_ sign- controlihili<;
the traffic- at ·second West Street and First Nort1fwB:;:de:ffi"

-on. h.is ·

who.

'and_-
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down by the defendant construction company while they
w~re working. daily in the area on curb, gutter and culvert
replacement, (T 79, 88, 92, 104, 105, 109, 110) leaves no
doubt that -the Court was justified in finding that the defendant was negligent. And of course on appeal, the review
must be in light most favorable to the plaintiff unless the
evidence so viewed ·is so completely contrary to the testimony as to compel findingEl as a matter of law in favor of
the defendant, the judgment is required to be affirmed.
The only testimony of the defendant and the only witness produced by the defendant, namely, the foreman of
the. construction job, Grant Palfreyman, testified that he
was·· directing two construction jobs at the same time, onP
at Fillmore along- U-100 and one at Holden, approximately
10 miles north ( T 142), and that while he, Grant Palfreyman, was working at the Holden job, his crew at Fillmore
moved the sig-ns at Second West Street and First North
Street each day for several days. (T 142) That the same
witness testified- that he knew the stop sign was down a
morning or two of the week of the accident. (T 141)
· The negHgence of the defendant company in not
placing the stop· sign or placing other control devices to
protect the-travelling motorists at this intersection was the
prcximate cause of the collision between Veri Justesen who
drove through the- unguarded inter~ection and into the vehicle· of the plaintiff, who was rightfully and carefully
travelling U-100. The plaintiff was entirely free of any
negligent conduct and no contributory negligence is argued
by ~ppellant.
·
· .· ·In case of Edmunds v. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215 364 P.
2d 1015, this court held defendant negligent in not placing
sufficient warning signs on an old highway after a new
section of highway parallel to the old had been- constructed
artdthatthe constructi-on company was not relieved either
·under·.-common law or contractual -duty, from adequately
warning the public by signs or barricades of any dang~r~us
condition on the old highway. In that case, the plambf:f.
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Edmunds, drove north from Cedar City on U. S. 91~ passed
the south junction of the old and new highways, and, us:ing ·
the new road, traveled to a point near the north end of hii
property. After briefly inspecting his property on the east,
he drove over the old highway by means of an access road·
to look at his property on the west side of the old road.·
Then Edmunds drove the automobile south on the old road
for approximately one mile when he drove into a drain-age
cut. The accident occurred between 3 and 4 o'clock in th~L
afternoon. The weather was clear and the visibility good.
'fh·~ road was level and unobstructed. How ·much more. neg~·
li1Pnt was Whiting Haymond Construction Company -in the.
instant case, when they left a main inters;ec>tion of U..;100·at
Sec~nd West Street, unprotected by any sign, warning de ..
vice or barricade?
The defendant in his Brief attempts to shift the blame•
to some boys who his witness testified had taken down
snme of the con~trurtion company signs, and ·a city.·officer·,
compelled the boys to return them. The.onbf pe.rsonto:testi..;.fy regarding this matter was Grant Palfreyman,. ('!':127),.
who testified that the stop sign which was put up against
the barricade or construction horse, was missing· Monday
IDC'rning. (T 127) He also testified that there had been' no .
strr sign in pla''e or against the barricade one or t\vo other
mornings of the week of the accident.· (T 141): · Yet,····Mr.:'·. :·.
Rasmussen of the Highway Patrol, stated: that the st6(t.
sign, the night of the accident, was lay!ng oil 'th~, ·gtound:·
near a mound of dirt where the construction work~ was·.·
p-oin~ on. (T 104) That it had been d'own for s.evetaLdays-.~
('1, 105, 109, 110) And that he saw no construction horses:.·
or other barricade the night of the accident. Everett· Ash,.
man. residing on the ·northwest corner of the·. intersecti<tn:. .
stated t}1at the stop sigTI_ was down~·'laying··on a-'dit:ch·:bank'.:
and had ·been for approximately a··· week· (T 79) ~:-a1td~tliat::
he didn•t _see' a construction::·nors~ ·o't \barrieada:~fT·::·~{})-:-~
That there ·was· a ·construction sign· pu't--up later:· (T: ~sJ} .
Officer :Merlin~ Hare· stated that-.he>.saw·:neither: const:tu~t-::
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tion horses, nor sign the night of the accident, nor the next
morning when he further investigated. (T 88) Maxim
Thornton, City Road Employee, testified that the stop sign
had been down most of the week before the accident,
(T 67), and that on Saturday morning, the day of the accident, when he passed this intersection going in a nortr.south direction, there was not a construction horse. (T 71)
It is pointed out that Halloween is the night of October 31st, Monday, and the accident occurred October 29th
Saturday. ·If there was any molesting of any signs, it
would., in all probability, be on Halloween, but at any rate
the testimony of Pafreyman is overcome by the testimony
of the other four witnesses who testified that the sign was
actually on the ground and that there was no construction
horse in place for it to be leaned against.
POINT II
DEFENDANT-NEGLIGENCE WAS
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The ·defendant was negligent and there was no intervening act of a third person which became a superseding
cause of the harm to the plaintiff preventing the actions of
the defendant from being a contributing proximate cause
of !he accident and the accompanying injuries. This Court
has spoken forcibly upon this matter in a case very similar
in fact.
Nyman v. Cedar City 12 Utah 2d 45 361 P.2d 1114. In
that case; on Center Street in Ced.ar City, which is a maintraveled, east-west street, hardsurfaced, 25 feet in width.
The city, in connection with installing curb and gutter, had
]eft a bank of dirt about two feet high and about four or
five feet wide along the north edge of the surfacing in the
100 to 200 east bl~k, and some blocks of concrete had been
dug up and. were left lying in the dirt. A culvert lay generally parallel to and in the row of dirt; about 40 feet from

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the east end thereof the culvert protruded ·about a foot ·be-·;
yond the dirt into the- surfaced portion ·of the highway:;,.about fifteen feet west a block of concrete .similarly pro-ject.ed about a foot or two beyond the south side of the dirt
onto the highway,. and about 20 feet further west ·still
ar,other did so. There were no barricades or warning signs
or lights to warn traffic of the obstructions mentioned. :About midnight on May 18, 1958, one Ivan Walton; Jr ..
driver of a Model T Ford automobile, with his wife and the·
plaintiff and. her husband got in the car; men"!n . front, ...
ladies in the rear, and started for a cafe iri Cedar Cariyou-·
east of town. Mr. Walton, while driving at a moderate. :speed, came upon the bank of dirt, and as the trial court·
found, the car struck the south edge of the windrow·. near
it' easterly end, skirted the edge of the windrow _and the..
front wheel or axle struck the end of the culvert. The car
continued onward along the . edge of the windrow and
stru;k the second concrete block with such force as to cause
the three passengers to be thrown from tlie'·Vehicle. Quoting from that case on page48:
The trial judge, with commendable judicial.:zeal,
prepared a memorandum decision in. which .. · he- set.
forth a clear and complete determination of the facts
as he viewed them, together with a lucid- and accurate :
exposition of the principle-s. of law applicable. thereto.·-:
He made separate findings on each of the ~City's eon-~-- .
tentions: that the headlights and brakes of.. the ancient .
automobile were not up to standard; thaf it ·was 11of ··
licensed for use upon the highways: and that the· p~u·- .·
ties, including the driver, had been drinking. H6wever,
he found expressly that none of:_ these factors proxi;.
mately caused the accident; and that the plaintiff wa~ .·. _
not guilty of any negligence which contributed. as .a
proximate cause thereto. He did find that Mr. Walto:rt
was negligent but held that it- wa,s only a concunJng::
proxirpite cause of the ai\Cident, and that the '·'aC.Cidelit ·.
would not have happened-but:for.the•coricurr€nt:hegl1~>r
gence of the defendant cjty;" .Ue also· corre.ctly r-uled.'7that the. negligence· o! ~he .--l}~s~. :~riye~_ :vyas 119~~ -.~~ :pu~~
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- ~ able to th~ :Ph;tintiff as guest passenger, and that.not~
-witll.stanqing his negligence she could recover .. from
'another tort-fe-asor whose neligence concurred to cause
her :injury~lt has long been accepted in this- jurisdiction that a city is require& to exercise reasonable care
to·keep.its streets in safErcondttion, -and that it may
be held liable for injuries proximately resulting from
its failure to do so.
Quoting further from Nyman v. Cedar City on Page
50;-the. quote states:

·;.But -a ·different principle applies if the later actor
· (the· driver Walton),- even though acting negligently,
did not beco~e aware of the danger until too late to
, avoid striking the obstruction. After, getting into such
· an emergency situation, his action in driving into the
obstruction could be regarded as acting in combination
.with the .prior negligence of the city as a concurri-ng
. · pro:xiroate cause of the accident. In that event his act
, would not. be the sole proximate cause. It is reasoned
. that 'this .is so hecause the condition of danger created
· by the- city is such that it could reasonably be anticipated that travelers on the street, negligent or other.·.wise,. may .not observe the dangerous condition until
-too late . to··. avoid it. Therefore, an accident· of· the
character here under· consideration might be expected
tO follow as a natural consequence of the dangerous
condition ·previously created, and consequently may be
·. deemed· to· be proximately caused by it. The evidence
, here ·is reasonably susceptible of the view that the
. "".-driver was :unable to see the obstruction until too late
_. to avoid it. In fact, that is the import of the plain.· tiff's ' evidence and the theory upon which the trial
'court rendered its judgment. ·Accordingly, the finding must be sustained.
The. ·only purpose for the State Road Commission or
other' legal ·.agencies to provide· and maintain .stop signs,
sema~hores, ,warning. signals or . other traffic .control. devices,· is to .warn the."> traveling public and .. :control ·their
driving·,actions. It is absurd for the defendant to state·
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in his Brief on Page ·g thereof that "If the stop sign 'had
been up, it would not have given Justesen any'more w~rn
ing of the highway or of the plaintiff's vehicle than he
already had." Justesen never even testified and there:can
be no supposition drawn from hearsay as to· .wbat he, observed or what he did not observe at the i:ritersEfutiori as
he approached it from a northerly direction (>ri-'·tlie 'bight
of October 29th, or what knowledge he .may:·.hav-e- had or
may not have had or remember or did not~rem~~ber.:·.~9J?.ti:9
cerning construction work being conducted by the aefendant in the area of Second West Street --and -U-100. The
fncts are certain that there was no stop slgn, '·Warning
sign, barricade or other control device to prbte·ct -or gfrect
or control the motoring public. That a stop sign is put in
place near the edge of the road approximately 20 feet back
from the cross walks and would be more than 100 feet back
from the center of the intersection to protect·and control
the flow of traffic into the intersection. ·verl· Justesen,
or any other motoris·t, traveling south • on Second · West
Street, had a stop sign been in place, would have 0nserved
the sign more than 200 feet before reaching' the· sign, could
have and would have brought his vehicle to such s.peed _and
traveling conditions as would permit him to ~stop _hi the
loeation of the stop sign, instead ·of traveling_ to an. area
passed where the stop sign was required to: he bef{?re there
was a showing of break marks or s.kid marks·· where it
was too late for the driver to avoid collidin'g with the
passing motorist, who had the right-of-way ·and ·who had
the right to believe that there was a stop.sign in place
ou Second West, and that- the driver on Second- West
would obey the traffic control.
- - - -· . - - -- · .... - ·
Counsel for the defendant· has cited -several cases- in
his Brief contending that they support the propositiQn that~ the actiQn,s -of the. defendant .in this _action were not ..negii.;.: -·
gent, proximately contributing to the. acCident~ An exam.; ·ination of the . facts of the cases~- cited clearly: :show·-Jthat :._;_
there is a fact situation entirely different from that of the
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in~t~Jl't ; _ ca~e/:Rieh~rd · E.

Ashby v; Whiting & Ha;ymond.
The defendant; in: citing such cases; points out an interven.
ing~ -act ~of a.· lhird :person commftted -in such manner ,as to
m3;ke it a superseding cause of harm to the third ..party
and· _there are· 111any cases where the intervening act can
and does become a superseding cause~ but a careful analysjs of the law pn causation and proximate cause will clearly' . ~eveai that 1n the instant case of Rfchard E. Ashby v.
Whiting &: Raymond Construction Company, with the contirluin:g: neiHience of the defendant, antidating and concttr-ring· wi.th the negligent act of the third party, Veri
J u'staseil:,- made the actions of the defendant actor proximate caus;e and him a joint tort feasor.
· · A statement of the law on negligence of intervening
acts directly applicable to the fact situation in the instant
case is contained in the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
Vol. II Section 447' Page 1196. We quote the following:
..

The fact that an intervening act of a third person

. is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner

· _ does not make it a superseding cause of harm to an.· other which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at ·the time of his negligent conduct
should have realized that a third person might
so act, or
(b) a· reasonable man knowing the situation .existing.-when the act of the third person was done would
not regard it as · highly extraordinary that the
third person had so acted, or
(c) the .· intervening act is a normal res.ponse to a
situation created by the actor's conduct ·and the
manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily
negligent.
Conlment on Clause (a): ·
. a,. The ~tatement in Clause (a) applies where
f :tli~te .-is ·a ·realizable:· Hkelinood
such act but the

of

likelihood is not .-enough iri "itself to make the actor's
. -"conduct negligent, the·coridp.ct being negligent because
y
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of other and greater risks which it entails. If the
realizable likelihood that a third person will act in the
negligent manner in which a particular third person
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the
risks which make the actor's conduct unreasonably
dangerous and therefore negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in 449.
There was a realizable likelihood when the defendant
left the stop sign down and the intersection with U-100
and Second West Street unguarded and uncontrolled by
warning signs or barricade, that a third person will act
in such manner as to negligently or otherwise drive into
tho unprotected and uncontrolled and unguarded intersection. The only purpose for having stop signs is to prevent
surh condition. Quoting now from Res,tatement of -the
Law of Torts, Vol. II, Section 449, Page 1202, the law is
stated as follows:
If the realizable likelihood that a third-- person
may act in a particular manner is the hazard· or one
of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such
an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor. from ·being liable for harm caused thereby.
Comment:
a. The happening of the very event the likelihood of which makes the actor's conduct_ n~gligent
and so subjects the actor to liability, cannot___relieve
him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act
committed or to do the act omitted is imposed to protect the other from this very danger. To· deny r~cov
ery because the other's exposure to the very risk,
from which it was the purpose ·of the duty _to protect
him, resulted in harm to him, would be to deprive
the .other of all protection and to. make the..<luty a
nullity.
·· · · · · · - · · ··
To further establish that there_ was no intervening act
!n the instant case constituting a superseding cause -of
harm, the rule on .intervening force as contai:Q.ed in.Jhe_Re-
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s~_~a~~~nt of_ the_· Law of Torts, Vol. II~· Section 443, Page
ll8~1squoted:

.

·.· ·

. . An intervening act of .a hutrtan being or a~imal
which is a normal response to the stimulus of a situa. tion cre3:ted by the actor's negligent conduct, is n9t a
superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about.
. Comment.: ·

· ··a. . The_ •rule stated in this Section applie·s not
only .~o a~~s done by the person who is harme~d or by
a third person as a normal response to the situation
created by the defendant's negligence, but also to acts
of animals reacting thereto in a manner normal to
them. It is not necessary that an act which is done
by the person harmed or by a third person should be
"reasonable"; that is, that the act should be one which
a·· reasonable man would regard as not involving an
·unreasonable risk to himself or others. It is enough·
· thatthe act ·is a normal response to the stimulus of
the situation created by the actor's negligence.
The act of the third person, in this case, Veri Juste-sen, though neglig£:mt, was only a concurring cause and the
defendant actor's negligence was still actively operating
and contributing as proximate cause to the harm of the
plaintiff. The law on this matter is contained in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sections 439-440-441, Page
1184, part of which is hereby quoted:
Section 439. If the effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously operate. to
bring about harm to another, the fact that the active
and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects
of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act
is also a substantial factor in bringing about the
,Parm does not protect the actor from liability.
Comment:
.
.
.· .
: ·a·,' Although in the_ great majority~ of cases to
which ·• the ·rule ·stated in this. Section is. applicable, the
effects of the conduct of both the actor and the third ·
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pers·on are in simultaneous active operation, it -is not
necessary that their operations shall .be absolutely
simultaneous. It is enough that the two are hi substantially simultaneous operation, as when the effect
of the conduct of one or the other has ceased its active
operation immediately before the other's conduct takes
active effect in harm to the other.
b. If the harm is brought about by the substantially simultaneous and active operation of the effects
of both the actor's negligent conduct and of an act of
a third person which is wrongful towards the other
who is harmerl, the conduct of each is a cause of the
harm, and both the actor and the third person are
liable.
'fhe act of Veri Justesen in the instant case was not
nn independent force not stimulated by a ·situation created
l)y the actor's conduct and a~cordingly, cannot be regarded
a~ i!ldividual and intervening. Quoting from Restatement
of the Law of Torts, Vol II, Section 441, Page 1187, Comment a, the law is stated as follows:·
·
· ·-·
The active operation of an intervening force -may
or may not be a superseding cause which relieves the
actor from liB.bility for another's harm occurring
thereafter. Whether it has this effect is determined
by the rules stated in 442 to 453. A force due to an.
act of a third person which is wrongful towards. the
other who is harmed may be only a contributory factor in producing the harm. If so, both the actor and the third person are concurrently liable. This is so,
although the actor's conduct has ceased to operate actively and has merely created a condition which is
made harmful by the operation of the intervening
force set in motion by the third person's negligent or
otherwise wrongful conduct.
In the in~tant case, the Court had·: the op~rtU:riity of
hearing the testimony, examining the facts and listel).ing
to the witnesses· and· could.- then determine f~om~-the·.cir
cumc;tances the likelihood of the defendant's neglig~nt-con-
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dU;ctin bringing ~harm to the plaintiff by stimulating the
pf the thir_~ party, Justesen. -: The Restatement of the
L~w-'nf_Tqrt~~ Yo!. II, _ Section 433, ~ages 1165 and f166 is
quoted as follows: · .
_
.
.
·
· · ·
a~t

·~drinsiderati6ns impO.;t~rif in determining,whether
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in pi·oducing
,harm.., . , . .
·'fhe fpUo·wing considerations are in themselves
, ()( in. ~ombipation with one another important in dete:rnunrng.:whether the actor's conduct is a substantial
{aGtQ:r:-in ;:})ringing about harm to another:
. (a)~- the number of other factors which contribute in
· · . prpducing the harm and the extent of the effect
G.
. '\vhich they have in producing it;
(b) whether after the event and looking back from
the harm to the actor's negligent conduct it an' pe~:r:s highly extraordinary that it should have
brought about the harm;
,, -.(c) )v4ether the actor's conduct has created a force
; "or sedes '·of forces which are in continuous and
'\''active operation up to the time of the harm, or
has ':created a situation harmle~.s unless acted
upon by other forces for which the actor is not
responsible.
The comment on Clause (b) is important to the circumstan,es in the instant case. We quote fr<'m Page 1167,
Volume II of the Restatement of the Law of Torts:
~Viewing the accident after the event. A result of
the actor's tortious conduct may be one which, either
in its extent or the manner in which or the sequence
of· events through which the conduct operates to bring
about the harm, is altogether different from the re'sult which the actor at the time of his negligence recognized or should have recognized as likely to result
· ··· therefrom. None the 'less, after the event, such a re. suit may not appear to _the court or jury to be so highextraordinary as to prevent the actor's ~onduct
from being a substantial factor in bri.:p.gfrig)t about.
What the actor does or :should expet~t ·. depends upon
.-''the' circumstances whi.ch h_e knows. or ·should _know and .
his forecast jn the light of these circumstances as to

. lv·
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what is likely to happen. The court's judgment, as to
whether the harm is a normal or highly extraordinary
result, is made after the event with the full knowledge
of all that has happened. This includes those surroundings of which at the time the actor knew nothing but which the course of events discloses to the
court.
The trial court, in its findings, found under No. 4
that the employees and agents of the defendant. should
have reasonably foreseen that persons driving vehicles
~outh on Second West Street and into_ the intersection of
Fir~t North Street, would not stop or proceed with the
usual caution engendered by a STOP. sign in place for traffic control at such corner, and that the defendant was negHgent in not replacing and maintaining· such STOP sign
or 'lther appropriate traffic control device cat this interse:tion after they had removed the STOP: sign:.~nd, _knew
that it was so .removed. The defendant's such negligence
proximately contributed to cause the collision;· which in
fa"t resulted, and consequently, the defendant's -such negligence caused and contributed to the ph.~.inti!f's injuries
Rnd damages complained of in hi~ eomplaint~ ~ · ·
In the light of all of the testimony, the, .supporting
<''l"t>S ar.d the substantive law, and with the ·requirement
thai- on appeal the court is required to review the matter·.
in the light most favorable to· the plaintiff, there ·ts nothing presented by the defendant's Brief to change~the ruling of the trial court. In the Haarstrich .v. Oregon-· Short
Line case 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100,-- (Utah 1927) ; the
ras~~ of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 1 Utah 2d 14R,
260 P. 2d 287 (Utah 19'53); the case of Toma v. Utah
Power and Light Co. 12 Utah 2cl. '278, ·365 P. 2d 788,-and
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines,· 12· Utah 2d 379, 366 P. 2d
989. each of the fact situations are entirely different from
the instant case. In the Toma - Utah Power and Light
c~.tse. the Utah Power and Light Company merely continued to have power continuing through their lines and the
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~f"Ountain '~tates ·.Construction -Com_pany had knowledge
that Utal). Power -and Light had ·refused to cut it off.
Tl~ere was_ nq continuing negligence: ·against Utah Power
and Light as there is against Whiting Haymond Construe-.
ti():Il (Jm:npany in the instant case. In the Velasquez v.
Greyhound Lines case, it appears from the court decision
and the facts that the driver of the semi-trailer was never
neg~ig'Emt to the point of being proximate cause, but that
the Greyhound Bus Company, as the Whiting Haymond
Company, was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to tpe- accident. In the Haarstrich v. Oregon Short
Line ease, the facts showed that it was doubtful that there
was any negligence on the part of the railroad in the operation of their lights and if so, it had nothing to do with
the accident. In the instant case the removal of the STOP
sign by the defendant company was definitely negligent.
It: precipitated and stimulated the negligent act of the
third party, Justesen, and the concurring negligence of
both caused the-injuries to the plaintiff.
'The -case at Bar is more nearly in line with the later
Supreme Court Case, Nyman v. Cedar City, Supra.
As to the cases which the defendant quotes relating
to past and future existence of a fact or condition, we have
no quarrel· whatsoever with the decision in those cases,
but· the fact situation of the instant cas-e does not require
the proof· of a present condition or state of facts at a
g1ven time as being a presumption that the same condition
or facts existed at a prior date. In the instant rase.
Tronper Gayle Rasmussen testified that the STOP sign
had remained down for several days prior to the accident
(T 105), and -in answer to the defense counsel's cross
examination: "During that week did you see it down on
the ground with your own eyes", the answer was: "Yes,
I did"~ City Employee, Maxim Thornton hauled trash
passed thearea where the STOP sign was supposed to be
on -the morning of the accident. He testified that there
was not a STOP sign or a construction hors,e (T 71). He
<
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passed the area in his work daily and stated that the
STOP sign had been down most of the week before the
accirtent. (T 67) Everett Ashman, property owner on the
northwest corner of the intersection stated that the STOP
~ign was down laying on the ditch bank for approximately
n week during the last week in October (T 79). The STOP
sip;n was down on the ground the night of the accident, accnrding to Trooper Rasmussen. (T 109, 110) We are not
required to make any presumption when we have dire·ct
te8timony that the STOP sign was down at the time of the
accident and had remained down according to three different witnesses for several days prior thereto.
Maxim
Thornton specifically stating that on October 27, 28 and
29th the STOP sign was down. (T 75 ) .
Under the abundance of evidence, there is no question
but what defendant Whiting Haymond Construction Company was negligent. That the negligence proximately contributed to the a"cident and that they were a contributing
tPrt feasor with Veri Justesen, and the rule of negligence·
cited in American Juris prudence, Vol. 38, Page 726, Sec.
69 i::: as follows :
The general rule is that whoever ·acts negligentlyis answerable for all the consequences that may ensu2
in the ordinary course of events, even tho:ugh such
consequences are immediately and directly . brought
about by an intervening cause, if such intervenhig
cause was set in motion by the original wrongdoer.·
An intervening cause does not operate~ to . exempt.
a defendant from liability under a wrongful. death
statute, if that cause is put into operation -by the de:fendant's wrongful act. One who is responsible for
disorder in a crowdis liable for injuries suffered by a
member of the crowd as a consequence of the disorderly acts.
·
As to contributing tort ·feasors, the Restatement of
the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Page 875 provides that "Each of
2 or more persons whose tortious conduct. is. a 'legal causp
of a harm to another, is liable to the other for the- entire
harm".
. .
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CONCLUSION
The employees and agents of the defendant removed
the STOP sign at Second West and U-100 while they were
in the process of doing construction work. That they left
it down for several days prior to the accident and the day
of the accident. That it was laying in the general area
on the ground and seen by several witnesses. The employees and agents or the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that persons driving vehicles south along
Second West Street into the intersection of U-100 would
not proceed with the caution engendered by a STOP sign
in place on the northwest corner of the intersection for
traffic controi. That the absence of the STOP sign, leaving an unguarded intersection, it was natural and foreseeable that a collision would and could occur. The defendant's negligence proximately contributed to the causP
of the collision and to the plaintiff's injuries. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. To reason
oth(:'rwise would be to say that traffic control signals are
unnecessary and useless and to remove them or obliterate
them is a harmless act.
Respectfully Submitted,

ELDON A. ELIASON
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
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